This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.
Introduction and Motivation
Economists often analyze international organizations and their policies. The International Monetary Fund scrutinizes the effects of its own programs, as do its critics. There is controversy over the effectiveness and side effects of World Bank programs, conducted both within the Bank and outside. It is thus curious that one of the currently most controversial international organizations -the World Trade Organization (WTO) -has largely escaped this scrutiny. There is, to my knowledge, no rigorous empirical literature that examines whether the WTO, and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have actually succeeded in terms of their own mandate, namely trade policy. In this paper, I begin to fill that void by providing a brief statistical analysis of the effects of GATT/WTO membership on trade policy. 1 The GATT was created to encourage trade liberalization after the Second World War.
The founding members were largely (but not exclusively) victorious developed countries; over time a large number of developing countries acceded, along with the rich countries that had been less successful in WW2. This enables me to provide two sorts of analysis. First, I compare measures of trade policy between GATT/WTO members and non-members, a cross-sectional approach that allows one to see if members have more liberal trade policy than non-members.
Second, I compare measures of trade policy for countries before and after accession to the GATT/WTO, a time-series approach that allows one to see if accession is associated with liberalization.
What I cannot do is compare actual trade policy with that from a world without the GATT/WTO. This raises a potentially important issue of interpretation. Trade policy has generally been more liberal postwar than it was in the preceding interwar period. This may be because the GATT/WTO has acted as a global provider of the public good of liberal trade policy, independent of its membership. While there are reasons to be skeptical of this view (discussed in the working paper version), it cannot be tested or rejected since we do not have data from a postwar GATT-free world. Thus I cannot (and do not) address the question of whether the very existence of the GATT/WTO has resulted in more liberal trade policy. What I can do is answer the question of whether trade policy is systematically more liberal for members of the GATT/WTO than for non-members, using variation over both time and countries. This immediately raises another major issue, namely "How does one measure trade policy?" In fact, it is widely acknowledged that there is no perfect measure of trade policy. This is true when one seeks to compare countries at a point in time, and even more so when one wishes to compare the trade policy of a given country at different points of time. As a result I look at over sixty measures of trade policy. In fact, I examine all quantitative measures of trade policy that I have been able to find. 2 It turns out that membership in the GATT/WTO is not significantly correlated with the vast majority of trade policy measures. Thus I conclude that there is little evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has actually liberalized trade policy. The exception is the Heritage Foundation's "Index of Economic Freedom" which usually indicates that GATT/WTO members enjoy somewhat more economic freedom than non-members.
The Mandate of the WTO
The WTO certainly thinks it is following its mandate of liberalizing and maintaining liberal trade. For instance, the many self-provided descriptions of the WTO include:
"By lowering trade barriers, the WTO's system also breaks down other barriers between peoples and nations…" "The WTO is the only international body dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, the legal ground-rules for international commerce and for trade policy. The agreements have three main objectives: to help trade flow as freely as possible, to achieve further liberalization gradually through negotiation, and to set up an impartial means of settling disputes" "The WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual countries' commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services markets." 3 Similarly and consistently, the third paragraph of the GATT provides motivation for the founding members:
"Being desirous of contributing to these objectives [raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, …] by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce …" It also seems safe to say that most economists think that the GATT has been at least moderately successful in liberalizing trade. For instance, Bagwell and Staiger (1999, p. 215) begin their paper "The central role played by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in shaping postwar trade policy is widely accepted." Krueger (1998, pp 2-3) writes:
"…the growth and liberalization of the international trading system has been the most prominent success of the postwar period … the great liberalization of tariffs and trade in the post-war period was achieved under the auspices of the GATT …" Irwin (1995, pp 326-327) writes: "… the major goal of the GATT founders was achieved: once again [as before WWI], the world economy experienced expanding international commerce facilitated by lowering trade barriers, a record that continued after the breakdown of the fixed-exchange-rate regime in the early 1970s… the GATT process with U.S. leadership did secure the very real accomplishments of eliminating a host of impediments to international trade." "The GATT scraped along at times, but had a distinct, downward ratchet effect on world trade barriers. For this reason, in spite of its small size and uncertain place as an economic institution, the GATT's long-run impact on the world economy has (arguably) been more significant than either that of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund."
The next section of the paper discusses the measurement of trade policy, while section 3 presents the methodology. The results are presented in the next section, and some interpretation, caveats and conclusions are in the final section.
Measures of Trade Policy from the Literature
All agree that measuring trade policy is difficult. Still, there are a large number of economists who have tried, usually in order to determine the effect of trade policy on growth. Dollar (1992) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , Harrison (1996) , Edwards (1997) , and Greenaway et. al. (2002) are recent example of this literature. This field has been criticized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) . They focus much of their attention on the issue of measuring trade policy, and are critical of Dollar's (1992) price-based measures of trade distortion and the measures developed by Sachs and Warner. Clearly relying on one or even a few measures of trade policy would be risky. This is especially true since Pritchett (1996) has demonstrated that a number of different measures of trade policy are mutually uncorrelated.
I do not attempt to provide a new measure of trade policy here. On the contrary, I want to exploit as many measures as possible that have been created and used by others. My empirical strategy is to examine a mass of trade policy measures, and search for indications of a connection between these indicators of trade policy and GATT/WTO membership.
The strength of this approach relies on the facts that: a) I employ a large number of trade policy indicators that are broad-ranging and comprehensive in scope, which; b) were not created by me; and c) were gathered or created by others for a different purpose (usually to link trade policy to growth). These three features of the data set should reduce any bias in my study. One potential cost of this strategy is the need to guard against the natural tendency to over-interpret the results, since the measures are far from independent.
I restrict my attention to the 168 countries that are covered in the Penn World Table mark 6, from 1950 through 1998, since I often condition on population and real GDP per capita data taken from that source. 4 This is not a serious limitation; the countries are listed in an appendix, along with the date of GATT/WTO accession.
A Taxonomy of Trade Policy Measures
Since there are many indicators of trade policy, I organize them into seven groups:
1. Openness (e.g., the ratio of trade or imports to GDP), an outcome-based measure, 2. Trade flows adjusted for country-characteristics (outcome-based), 3. Tariffs (policy incidence-based), 4. Non-tariff barriers (incidence-based), 5. Informal or qualitative measures, 6. Composite indices, and 7. Measures based on price outcomes. 
Tariffs
A number of measures of tariffs are available. All are affected by the well-known fact that tariff revenues divided by total imports is a downward-biased measure of tariff rates, since highly taxed imports tend not to be imported. Nevertheless, these measures may work well in practice. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000, p. 316) write:
"We are especially struck and puzzled by the proliferation of indexes of trade restrictions. It is common to assert in this literature that simple tradeweighted tariff averages or non-tariff coverage ratios -which we believe to be the most direct indicators of trade restrictions -are misleading as indicators of the stance of trade policy. Yet we know of no papers that document the existence of serious biases in these direct indicators, much less establish that an alternative indicator performs better (in the relevant sense of calibrating the restrictiveness of trade regimes). An examination of simple averages of taxes on imports and exports and NTB coverage ratios leaves us with the impression that these measures in fact do a decent job of rank-ordering countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes."
The tariff measure referred to by Rodriguez and Rodrik is available from the World Development Indicators from 1970 though the end of the sample in 1998 (with gaps).
Alternative measures are available in cross-sections from: 1) the Barro-Lee data set (Lee's measure of own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods, constructed from UNCTAD data); 2) Edwards (1996) who collected data on total revenue from taxes on international trade as a proportion of total trade; 3) Pritchett (1996) who provides weighted average total import charges for four different aggregates for a number of countries; and 4) Heitger (1987) who tabulates point estimates and (within-country, inter-sectoral) standard deviations for effective rates of protection for a number of countries.
Non-Tariff Barriers
The coverage of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in terms of total imports is another widely used measure of trade policy. It is widely recognized that the presence of NTBs is a potentially poor substitute for the importance or intensity of the NTBs, so this measure of trade policy is certainly measured with error. I take advantage of the NTB coverage cross-section available from the Barro-Lee data set, which provides information on own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital goods, again derived from UNCTAD sources. I also use the measures from Pritchett (1996) who provides analogues for four different aggregates for a number of countries in 1987.
Informal or Qualitative Measures
A number of more informal or qualitative measures of trade policy have been created, and I try to take full advantage of them all. For instance, the World Bank has created measures of "trade orientation" for two different periods of time for forty countries. These range from one ("strongly outward oriented") through four ("strongly inward oriented"). The Heritage Foundation has created an index of overall "economic freedom." This measure runs from one (a score signifying institutions and policies most conducive to economic freedom) through five (least conducive). The overall index of economic freedom is determined by ten factors, of which one is "trade policy," also organized on a scale from one (very low protectionism) through five (very high protectionism). The trade policy factor is primarily determined by tariff rates, adjusted for NTB coverage and corruption.
The NBER study lead by Anne Krueger has created measures of the phase of trade liberalization. These range from one through five (most free). Finally, Edwards (1997) uses cross-country rankings of trade orientation derived from regression-based indices of import distortions for two different years.
Composite Measures
Harrison (1996, p. 427) describes a number of trade policy measures for developing countries, each of which is available as a panel variable and is used by her to study the effects of trade policy on growth. Three of these are composites. They include: 1) an index "derived using country-specific information on exchange rate and commercial policies" taken from Papageorgiuo et al (where higher values indicate more liberal policy; this is denoted "Index from FX and commercial policy" below); 2) an index "calculated using country sources on tariffs and no n-tariff barriers" derived by the World Bank (again, higher values indicate more liberal policy; this composite is denoted "Index from Tariffs and NTBs" below); and 3) a measure of indirect bias against agriculture resulting from industrial protection and exchange rate overvaluation (where higher means lower protection). Edwards (1997) also provides measures of openness, as computed by Sachs and Warner, for different decades.
Measures based on Residuals from Trade Equations
Leamer has used deviations of actual trade from trade as predicted by an empirical factorproportions model of trade to measure trade policy. I use this measure (as supplied by Edwards, 1997) . Pritchett (1996) has provided a number of variations on this theme using data for 1982 and a number of different sub-aggregates. A less structural approach is taken by Hiscox and Kastner (2002) . They use fixed country-year residual effects from two gravity models of trade (a simple version which links imports to GDP and distance, and an augmented one which adds measures of wealth, land, and capital) to derive measures of trade policy orientation.
Price-Based Measures
Above and beyond her three indices of trade policy, Harrison (1996) provides a number of price-based measures of trade policy that are available as panel variables. These include: 1) the black market foreign exchange premium; 2) a country's "movement to international prices" derived using Penn World Table data as the benchmark; and 3) a modified version of Dollar's (1992) well-known "price distortion" index (where high values indicate distortion).
7 Pritchett (1996) also provides measures of both the level and variability of Dollar's price distortion measure.
Methodology
I start with simple regression techniques, in order to see whether straightforward methods reveal gross obvious differences in observable trade policy between GATT/WTO members and non-members. My cross-sectional evidence is derived from equations of the form:
while my panel evidence is derived from equations of the form:
where i denotes a country, t denotes time, and:
• TP denotes a measure of trade policy,
• GATTWTO is a binary dummy variable which is unity for GATT/WTO members,
• X is a set of conditioning variables,
• α and {γ j } are nuisance coefficients,
• {δ i } and {φ t } are a comprehensive set of nuisance country-and time-specific fixed effects, and
• ε is a well-behaved residual.
The coefficient of interest to me is β. If β is insignificantly different from zero, there is no evidence that countries inside the GATT/WTO have trade policies different from those outside the multilateral trade system. In this case there is no evidence that GATT/WTO membership is associated with more liberal trade policy.
I estimate β for my cross-sectional measures in three different ways: 1) with ordinary least squares (OLS) without augmenting variables, i.e., setting γ j =0 ∀j; 2) with OLS but adding three augmenting variables ("remoteness" and the natural logarithms of population and real GDP per capita); and 3) with instrumental variables. Data for population and real GDP per capita come from the Penn World Table 6 . Remoteness represents distance from a country to output in the rest of the world. It is defined for country i as the inverse of the mean of log real GDP for country j divided by the log of distance between i and j; Fiji and New Zealand are the most remote countries in the sample. I include remoteness, population, and real GDP per capita to account for some wellknown features of trade policy. Large and poor countries are systematically more protectionist, as noted by Rodrik (1995) who argues that richer countries have more developed tax structures;
smaller countries may also proportionately have more to gain from trade.
My instrumental variable estimates represent a crude first effort to handle both simultaneity bias and measurement error. I use the country's "polity" score as an instrumental variable for GATT/WTO membership. I take this variable from the Polity IV data set, which is available for a wide range of countries through the end of my sample. This variable ranges from -10 for strongly autocratic systems to +10 for strongly democratic systems. 
Regression Results
I tabulate estimates of β for my cross-sectional measures of trade policy in Table 2 along with the absolute value of the t-statistic that tests the hypothesis of no effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade policy (computed with a robust standard error). The results in Table 3, coverage and slightly higher tariffs; neither of these effects is significant at conventional levels.
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Insignificant differences can stem either from similar means or large variances (or both).
Which is responsible for these results? We can shed light on this by examining Figure 2 , an analogue to the first figure that focuses on import duties as a percentage of imports. Histograms are provided for eight individual years between 1977 (when the sample of countries with data became large) and 1998, both for GATT/WTO members and non-members. While there are never significant differences in mean tariffs between members and non-members, the reason varies over time. In the early years non-members had higher average tariffs (23%) than GATT members (10%), but the variation in tariffs across non-members was sufficiently high that the differences are insignificant. 12 After the early to mid 1980s, the differences in both average tariffs and their cross-country variation become small, so the insignificant t-tests result from similar means. Statistical analogues are available in Appendix 3. The tables there split tariff rates for members and non-members by income (real GDP per capita) and population. For each bin, the raw difference between the tariff rates for non-members and members are recorded, along with the p-value for a t-test of equality. The results are remarkably consistent; there are almost no significant differences between tariffs for members and non-members. When income is below-median, GATT/WTO members always have higher tariffs than non-members, sometimes significantly so. Above-median income members have lower tariffs, though never at statistically significant levels. Population doesn't seem to work consistently, and the results are pretty consistent across years.
Further confirmation of the loose relationship between GATT/WTO membership and trade policy is available in Figure 3 . This presents a graphical "event study" for the effects of accession on nine measures of trade policy (those that can be quantified over time). For instance, the top-left graphic shows the mean level of openness (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) at the time of entry for countries acceding between 1950 through 1998, along with a plus/minus two standard deviation confidence interval. To the right of the vertical line (which marks accession) are data for the years after entry; the years preceding accession are graphed to the left.
The horizontal line marks the average level of openness for those inside the GATT/WTO. It seems that none of the 64 measures of trade policy is strongly and consistently tied to GATT/WTO membership, with the exception of the index of economic freedom. The majority of the coefficients linking trade policy to membership are small; not many more coefficients are significantly different from zero than would be expected if the true effect of membership on policy is nil. 13 Of course, failure to reject the null hypothesis of no significant difference between trade policies of members and non-members does not validate the hypothesis. Still, any effect that the WTO has (and the GATT had) on trade policy seems either subtle or weak.
Liberalization Results
The previous section examined the linkage between the levels of trade policy and membership in the GATT/WTO. More evidence is available by looking at dramatic regime changes in trade policy -liberalizations -and membership. I now pursue this tack briefly. Table 4a presents the developing countries described as "closed" by Sachs and Warner (1995) . It is interesting to note that 28 of the 35 closed developing countries were in the GATT at the time the list was composed in late 1994; most of these had been members for over twenty years. That is, the GATT repeatedly admitted countries that were closed (at least by the SachsWarner criteria) and remained closed following entry. Sachs and Warner) . Again, it seems that the GATT admitted closed countries and allowed them to remain closed for long periods of time (using the Sachs-Warner criteria).
Others have also created liberalization dates; probably the most well known were created by the World Bank (see Papageorgiou, Choksi and Michaely, 1990) . The World Bank's liberalization dates are tabulated in Table 5 , along with the dates of GATT membership. Of the 36 episodes of liberalization tabulated, two-thirds followed GATT accession, often with substantial lags. Four episodes preceded membership and eight coincided. The average lag between GATT accession and the onset of liberalization exceeds eight years (even including the cases where liberalization preceded accession). Greenaway et al (2002) use two additional indicators of liberalization: 1) the date of a country's first "structural adjustment loan" from the World Bank, and 2) dates derived by a World Bank team from a set of indicators including tariffs, quotas, export distortions and exchange rates. In table 6 I list both sets of liberalization dates along with GATT accession dates. These liberalization dates again usually lag GATT accessions, often dramatically. Indeed, the mean lag between accession and liberalization exceeds fifteen years for both measures of liberalization, and median lags are longer.
I conclude that there is no clear evidence that GATT accession or membership spurred trade liberalizations.
Interpretation
Perhaps the non-effect of GATT membership on trade policy is unsurprising. There are at least two potential reasons. First, the GATT built in a large number of devices to allow countries to pursue their own policies. For instance, article VI of the GATT allowed members to respond to dumping; article XII allowed a response for balance of payments considerations;
article XVIII allowed protectionism for deve loping countries; there were opt-outs in articles XIX through XXI for a variety of reasons including public morals, health, security, and so forth;
article XXXV allowed particular countries simply to ignore other members of the GATT; and there was a procedure to waive obligations in article XXV. That is, there was plenty of room for countries to be in the GATT de jure without adhering to the spirit of the agreement. Disentangling the relative importance of these explanations for the small effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade and trade policy is a good topic for futur e research.
Caveats and Outstanding Issues
It would be nice to add more structure to the statistical model, which might deliver more convincing results. To do this, one needs to model the aggregate stance of trade policy directly.
Most of the recent literature on endogenous protection is primarily concerned with the crossindustry incidence of protection, rather than its international or intertemporal nature, a fact noted in Rodrik's (1995) survey; see e.g., Trefler (1993) . Better instrumental variables are desirable and might be available with more structure.
I reiterate a point first raised in the introduction. It might be the case that the GATT/WTO has acted as an international provider of public goods in the form of global trade that is more liberal than it would have been in the absence of the system. That is, the GATT/WTO might matter, independent of its membership. It is impossible to test this novel hypothesis empirically.
Measurement error remains a serious problem in this literature, so conclusions should be cautious. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the measurement error here concerns the regressand, not an independent variable. This measurement error does not bias regression results, though it might weaken them.
14 I have also tried, using factor analysis but without success, to uncover relationships between GATT/WTO membership and combinations of measures of trade policy. This is a potentially interesting area for further research. Further, all the analysis above used aggregate data; a more dis-aggregated approach might deliver stronger results.
If -as seems consistent with much of the data -the GATT/WTO is not associated with more liberal trade policy, why does it exist? As noted by Staiger (1995) , it may be that the organization simply coordinates trade policy without systematically liberalizing it for members.
It may also serve a role as a disseminator of information or coordinate punishments; see Bagwell and Staiger (1999) . This remains a good topic for future research. 
Conclusion
In 1987, Indian tariff revenues reached 53% of import values. India had been a founding member of the GATT in 1948. Yet Indian tariffs revenues have never fallen below 20% of Indian imports, at least during the 25 years for which we have data. This from a measure of tariffs known to be biased down since highly taxed goods tend not to be imported! Comparable tariff data exist for 91 countries in 1987, at which time 89 countries had lower tariffs than India.
23 of these 89 countries were not members of the GATT; they had tariff rates averaging 15.7%.
GATT members collected tariffs averaging 11.4% (a figure that is statistically indistinguishable from that of outsiders at even the 10% level membership in the multilateral trade system is associated with more liberal trade policy. The exception is that members of the system usually enjoy slightly more economic freedom using the Heritage Foundation's index. There are almost no discernible differences between GATT/WTO members and non-members for tariff rates, measures of non-tariff barrier coverage, price-based measures, measures of openness, and so forth. Are we really so sure that the WTO has actually liberalized trade ... or is actually liberalizing it? PWT6, 1950 PWT6, -1998 ; samples vary.
Effect of GATT/WTO entry on Trade Policy
Mean, with +/-2 standard deviations; GATT/WTO averages marked. Black-Market Prem. Figures are average tariff rates for non-members minus those for GATT/WTO members (p-value for hypothesis of equality from t-test recorded in parentheses). Population and Real GDP per capita ("Income") taken from PWT6.
